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REPORT FROM EAST JAVA
TRANSLATORS1 NOTE
Detailed eyewitness descriptions of the turmoil in town and 
countryside in the months following the "coup" of September 30, 1965, 
have been rare, particularly in those regions which experienced the 
worst violence. In subsequent accounts of the massacres of this 
period, writers coming from the right have tended to stress popular 
spontaneous rage, particularly from Muslim groups, while those from 
the left have emphasized systematic, centrally directed slaughter. 
Neither version has credibly accounted for why there was such a 
wide geographic variation in the level of the killings (for example, 
why in Hindu Bali and Muslim East Java, the numbers killed were 
very high, while in Muslim West Java they were relatively low, with 
Central Java falling in between).
The document translated below fills in a few of the pieces, 
showing how neither the version of the left nor that of the right is 
wholly true or wholly false, in describing the nature of the mas­
sacres. It is a report to his superiors from an Intelligence Officer in 
East Java at the end of November 1965, which describes the post­
coup campaigns and purges in the officer's area of operations.
An important feature of the report—probably the first intel­
ligence report of the period to be translated and published in 
English—is the "language of intelligence" used there, which is a 
curious mixture of Indonesian, English, and fractured Dutch (with 
most of the English words being military terms). As this language 
gives a fascinating insight into the mental culture of the members of 
the intelligence community of that and possibly later periods, we have 
attempted to retain its flavor in the translation. Thus, the Dutch 
words (with their mis-spellings) have been retained, with the English 
equivalent following in brackets, for example: betrouwbaar [D: trust­
worthy]. English words used in the original have been indicated by 
quotation marks in the translation, followed by [E], for example: 
"understanding" [E].
All translators' notes are in brackets [ ], and all parentheses ( ) 
used are those of the original author. Abbreviations have been 
elucidated whenever possible. The erratic capitalization of the 
original has been retained in the translation. All the footnotes have 
been added by the translators.
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REPORT FROM EAST JAVA
I. People's Actions1
As is well known, actions to crush the GESTAPU2 and its mastermind, the 
PKI [Indonesian Communist Party] began in the middle of October (whereas pre­
viously this campaign had only been in the form of statements). Due to the 
tardiness of the authorities in taking action, much of the initiative in the 
suppression was seized by the people, with the Religious groups taking the lead. 
At the outset these actions were unorganized and misguided [ngawur], as they hit 
neither "organic" [E] nor strategic PKI targets. It was only after the Akbar 
[mass] rally in Surabaya on October 16, 1965, that a Crushing Action Command 
was set up which endeavored to coordinate these actions and establish one, 
responsible command. The phase of people's spontaneity was followed by efforts 
at more organization, and by formation of a United Action Command. This Action 
Command was comprised of the parties and their Mass Organizations: the Nahdatul 
Ulama [NU], the Catholic Party, the PSII [Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, 
Indonesian Islamic Union Party], Parkindo [Partai Keristen Indonesia, the Protes­
tant Party], the IPKI [Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, League of 
Upholders of Indonesian Independence, an army-affiliated party], and the PNI- 
Hardi. The PNI-Ali 3 was also asked to join, and in fact at that time Basuki 
Rachmat4 wanted the group to participate. But the PNI-Ali's attitude was very 
indecisive; they said that they had to await instructions from their headquarters, 
and thus they were left out. It was not until after the above-mentioned mass 
meeting that the PNI-Ali was willing to join. Meanwhile, until now PERTI and 
PARTINDO have not been invited to participate since they are considered to be 
front organizations for the PKI.s 12345
1. Although translated as "actions" the meaning of the Indonesian "aksi-aksi" is 
really closer to a political or a mass campaign.
2. "Gestapu" is derived from Gerakan Tigapuluh September, or "September 30th 
Movement," the action, led by Lt.-Col. Untung, which on the morning of October 
1, 1965 assassinated six leading generals and briefly seized key installations in 
Jakarta, and which ultimately led to Sukarno's downfall and the birth of Suharto’s 
New Order.
3. During the early and mid-1960s there were two major competing factions 
within the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), the more conservative of which was 
headed by Hardi and the more radical by Party Chairman (and former Prime 
Minister) Ali Sastroamidjojo and by Secretary General Ir. Surachman. In August 
1965 the Ali faction asserted its ascendancy by suspending Hardi and other more 
conservative leaders from party membership. After September 30, the Ali faction 
continued to hold to the PNI’s left-wing ideological formulations and to support 
Sukarno. In this report it appears as the PNI-Ali, and later as the PNI-Ali- 
Surachman (often abbreviated to PNI-ASU). At this time the more conservative 
elements of the PNI in other parts of Java were headed by Osa Maliki and Usep 
Ranuwidjaja, but in East Java the faction apparently continued to be known as 
the PNI-Hardi. This wing of the PNI was now making common cause with the 
ascendant military.
4. Brig. Gen. Basuki Rachmat had been Territorial Commander of East Java 
(Kodam VIII) since late 1962. He was replaced on November 26, 1965.
5. Perti (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Islamic Education Union) was a small
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The NU has been very dominerend [sic] [D: dominant] in these actions of the 
People, even to the point of "over-confidence" [E] and ignoring the other parties. 
On the other hand, the Action Command was very slow [to act]. The idea behind 
these Commands was to doortreken [Ds extend] them from the Provincial Center 
through the Kabupaten [districts] and Kecamatan [subdistricts], right down to the 
villages. But the execution was exceedingly slow, to the extent that in outlying 
areas many established themselves without the knowledge of the top Command. 
And if the top Command did know about them it never contacted them, so that 
the goal of having a unified Command and Coordination was not achieved.
While some of these actions were undertaken by the people alone, some were 
performed with the "understanding" [E] of the military, and some were carried out 
by the authorities themselves, particularly the Army. In oeverwegend [sic] [D: 
overwhelmingly] anti-Communist areas, the central role was taken by the People, 
as in Madura and parts of Besuki. Due to the resolve of the Military Regional 
Commander [Dan Rem] (Sumadhi) in the Malang area and Besuki, the crushing 
actions were undertaken on the initiative of the Commander and under his leader­
ship. Because of the Regional Commander's intervention, victims among the anti- 
Communist forces could be avoided. In the regions where the PKI was strong, 
such as Madiun and Bojonegoro, actions by the people were rare, and only now 
are we beginning to see activity from the People. In this region, the military 
(Willy Sudjono) has been firm and has carried out arrests against GESTAPU and 
PKI elements.
Alongside this Action Command which organized the "open" [E] actions, there 
exists a committee consisting of the NU, IPKI, the Catholics, the Protestants, 
Muhammadiyah, and the PNI-Hardi, for the purpose of forming a "brain trust" [E] 
for the crushing of the PKI. Its aims are oriented more towards political opera­
tions, it has more planning and better organization, and it is focusing on the 
mental and organizational annihilation of the PKI and its mass organizations. The 
targeting also means voorbereiding [D: preparation] for a radical verandering [Ds 
transformation] of the police and the leadership of the state, with the cooperation 
of the Armed Forces, especially the Army.
II. Banyuwangi
The Karang Asem Incident in Banyuwangi
[1] Karangasem lies between Genteng and Banyuwangi, and it is an experimen­
tal village. This village is a center for "gun-slingers" [E] and robbers. After 
September 30 it became a hideout for the PKI and PR [Pemuda Rakyat—People's 
Youth, the Communist youth organization]. This was discovered by the Pemuda 
Ansor [NU Youth], and, with spirits ablaze and insufficient calculations, they 
made an attack on Karangasem from Muncar and Banyuwangi with four trucks, 
three cars, and four motorcycles. The PKI got wind of their plan and made 
preparations.
When the Pemuda Ansor entered the village, the PKI was ready. As the 
trucks entered, trees were felled behind them. The Ansor burned several houses,
conservative though maverick Islamic party, originally based in West Sumatra. Its 
leadership at the Jakarta level, however, particularly party-head Siradjuddin 
Abbas, took a strongly Nasakom line. Partindo (Partai Indonesia) was a small 
leftist party headed by PKI-sympathizers, with a base in the Chinese peranakan 
community.
138
and after they had burned them and were preparing to leave, they were attacked, 
and their trucks were burned.
Gerwani [Indonesian Women's Movement, a PKI-affiliated organization] 
exploited this opportunity. They entered the houses disguised as Fatajat NU [NU 
Women's Organization]. Once they [i.e., Ansor] were inside, PKI executioners 
were ready there with their instruments of death, and the Ansor were afgemakt 
[D: murdered]. It was impossible to avoid Ansor suffering 64 victims. This was 
reported at once to the Regional Commander of Malang, who took immediate and 
direct action. Colonel Sumadhi himself led this operation to Banyuwangi. It was 
reported that the PKI also used vuurwapens [D: firearms]. They were then 
trapped by the military along the coast.
2. The Banyuwangi Military District Command (Kodim) of Colonel Supaat (former 
Commander of the "Raiders" [elite troops] unit in Jember) was very resolute and 
spirited in the annihilation of the PKI. The troops in Banyuwangi were from the 
515th Battalion (one company) and Field Artillery ["Armed," Artillery Medan] 
troops from Malang. PKI strongholds in Banyuwangi are primarily in the kecama- 
tan of Tegaldelimo, Banyurejo, and Pesanggerahan. A store of rice was also 
found in the area of the Mt. Argapura complex.
3. In the city of Banyuwangi, village strongholds of the PKI were the villages of 
Tumenggungan, Malayu, and Mandar. In these three villages inhabitants were 
forbidden to listen to the Radio or read the newspapers, and rumors were spread 
that the troops were Nekolim [Neo-colonialist-imperialist] troops. During a house- 
to-house search, an American flag was found in the home of a PR figure. When 
this man was captured by ABRI, he admitted that if G.30.S [the September 30th 
Movement] had succeeded, government figures and leaders of the other parties 
blacklisted by the PKI would have been forced to drive around the city flying the 
American flag.
In the area of Rogojampi, many PKI figures were kidnapped and murdered by 
religious groups. The Marhaenist groups were also active here.
Situbondo
Kodim [Military District] Commander Major Indun was active in the annihila­
tion of G.30.S. The people are very anti-Chinese, as many of them are Arabs. 
There is a band here that calls itself the robber band [barisan mating]. Also in 
Situbondo there is a Religious leader, K. Asa'at (Asembagus) who is very influen­
tial throughout Besuki and all the way to Madura. He is also anti-"two-faced- 
ness" [plintat-plintut, a Sukarnoist term], and the Command is operated from here. 
Arrests and killings began four days after the September 30 incident.
As the Government was late in providing protection for the Panji sugar 
factory, it was burned down by SOBSI [All-Indonesian Labor Union Central], In 
the Situbondo region the "dropping" [E] of 200 weapons has been signaleerd [D: 
detected]. When they [the perpetrators] were arrested, they admitted that these 
were police weapons. At Pasir Putih there were military exercises by the PR that 
were led by elements from the AL [Angkatan Laut, Navy],
Bondowoso
The Kodim Commander is Lieutenant Colonel Budian. He is a Saptamargais 
[army loyalist—from Sapta Marga, the Army Oath of Loyalty]. The extermination 
was carried out very violently. The community, especially the Religious groups, 
were very active in reporting PKI elements to those in authority, who would then 
take action. Only in ODM [Onder Distrik Militer, Military Sub-Districts] and
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BODM [Badan Onder Distrik Militer, Military Sub-District Bodies] were many PKI 
elements found, who were also often able to hamper the KODIM's activities. 
However, actions were able to be taken thanks to the cooperation of the people. 
The PKI attempted to provoke a split between ABRI and the people, but thanks to 
good cooperation, this foul tactic of the PKI was defeated.
J ember
As in Bondowoso, things began with posters and were continued with a public 
meeting. The People's actions were the same as in Bondowoso. Just as in Bondo­
woso, several elements of Armet (Artileri Medan Tempur [Battlefield Artillery]) 
were found here protecting with their weapons members of the PKI. BODM was 
also greatly geinfilteerd [sic] [D: infiltrated]. The Kodim Commander, Winoto, has 
been firm, but he stuit moeilijkheden [D: ran into difficulties] with a Puterpra^ 
that is sterk [D: strongly] infiltrated by the PKI. The Brigif [Infantry Brigade] 
Commander is Col. Djamal. The PKI bases are in the Ambulu area, the planta­
tions at Bandialit, Sukamade, and Sarungan in the direction of Banyuwangi 
(Karangasem, within the Osing quarter of the city). The PKI sabotaged many 
Trains. In the Jatiroto Randu Agung incident, a freight train was derailed by 
them.
In re troops there was in Jember (Sukorejo) a "training centre" [E], however, 
which was transferred from the area several days after September 30th. All that 
remained was Armet and part of the 515th Battalion.
In response to the PKI actions, after the posters and general meeting, the 
Religious groups that were present wanted to burn down the HQ of the PKI, but 
they got help and protection from the Armet. And the PKI engaged in counter 
activities, erasing the [anti-PKI] graffiti. Disband the PKI was replaced with 
Disband the NU. Kill Aidit was replaced with Kill the Generals. The PKI used 
children (from elementary and junior high schools) to carry this out. The mass 
of the people became angry, but they could do nothing, because of the protection 
provided by the Armet [to the PKI], In order to prevent conflict, the local 
government used [ordinary] prisoners to erase the graffiti, but by the next 
morning they were there again.
At a mass rally of the Religious groups, resolutions were passed demanding 
the banning of the PKI, the resignation of Bandrio [Subandrio, the Foreign 
Minister] and the severing of relations with the RRT [People's Republic of China].
It was after this that the Kodim became very active and, together with the 
people, took actions to crush the PKI. In recent days, conditions here have been 
the same as the other areas, with killings and kidnappings of members of the PKI 
and of its Mass organizations.
III. The Madura Residency
Actions in this area have been more gruesome than those in other areas. At 
the start, in Pamekasan there was no response from the Kodim, but the people 
began to take actions on their own. Arrests of PKI leaders and cadres were 
undertaken, and in several places (tobacco storage) Warehouses were burned down,
6. Perwira Urusan Territorial dan Perlawanan Rakyat, Officer for Territorial 
Affairs and People's Resistance. These officially replaced the BODM in the early 
1960s.
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most of them owned by Chinese considered to be financiers of the PKI. Also the 
contents of several Chinese-owned stores were brought out on the street and 
burned. Most of the leaders were arrested, and the top leadership fled to Java. 
But later, two men (Djauhari and Danafia) who also belonged to the East Java 
leadership were captured.
The Kodim in Pamekasan was replaced, and there is now close cooperation 
with the people. The same happened with the Kodim in Sampang, Bangkalan, and 
Sumenep.
In Sampang, as is known, the Police chief, Sutarjo, was murdered at a large 
rally. The murder took place on the Platform in the town square of Sampang at 
about four o’clock, but the body was not removed until six o’clock. This 
policeman had indeed participated in the suppression of the PKI during the 
Madiun affair [1948]. But his activities in Sampang indicate that he was affiliated 
with the PKI. His entire family from Magetan was PKI, and the Magetan PKI 
proposed Sutarjo as a candidate for Bupati of that district. So he was oriented 
toward the PKI. And before all of this, during the suppression, he was less than 
responsive, and as it were hampered these efforts. Even before the September 
30th Movement, he once arrested a kiai [venerated teacher of Islam] who was 
very influential in Sampang, and this, of course, earned him antipathy from the 
people.
In Sampang and Bangkalan the situation has been the same as above. 
Recently anti-Javanese sentiment has arisen, because people think that it was 
Javanese who brought the PKI into Madura. But the NU leadership took action 
quickly in order to prevent [anti-Javanese] excesses. Because the NU and Ansor 
are dominant in Madura and because their leaders were firm, there was a 
tendency towards "over-confidence” [E], Also, the leaders of the police and 
military had close connections with them, and periodically asked help from Ansor 
and Banser [Barisan Serba Guna, All-Purpose Unit]. The leaders of the NU and 
Ansor in Pamekasan were K. Sja’rani and Karim, the former Mobrig [Mobile 
Brigade of the Police] Inspector.
Bangkalan being closest to Surabaya has been a source of manpower for 
actions in Surabaya. If there are actions that require a show of counterforce, 
this is brought in from Bangkalan.
IV. The Residency of Surabaya
The movements outside Surabaya have been more intensive than those within 
the City proper. In the City of Surabaya itself, the movements began on October 
16 with a large rally and organized acts of destruction (and the burning of the 
PKI’s CDB [Comite Daerah Besar, Province-level leadership (office)] on Pahlawan 
Street). In comparison with other Cities, Surabaya was the most "smooth" [E], 
Actions were carried out continuously. At first, indeed, the sparsity of actions in 
Surabaya was largely the result of the influence of Territorial Commander Basuki 
Rachmat, even to the point where in several Kabupaten political parties issued 
joint statements with the PKI. These meetings were diaranggeer [sic] [arranged] 
by the Governor. Then outside the City of Surabaya activities began—burnings 
and arrests as in Jombang, Mojokerto, and Sidoarjo. In addition, the contents of 
several Chinese stores were taken out onto the streets and burned.
After the large rally in Surabaya, purges were finally organized against 
Gestapu and PKI elements, as well as against workers who had taken over the 
enterprises (the Ngagel Complex and State Trading Enterprises) on October 1,
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1965, but who were not arrested until October 18, 1965. By now much has 
changed, and the "caretaker" [E] Mayor, Colonel Sukotjo, has already organized 
purges in the Municipal Bureaucracy and in Neighborhood Associations [RT] and 
Kampung Associations [RK] which before had almost been controlled by the PKI. 
Removals [of PKI people from posts] have been carried out in Government Offices. 
Continuous purges have been performed in an effective and systematic manner, 
foiling the PKI’s contingency plans. Efforts at smashing PKI morale to real 
political effect are still in the process of being organized. The mass concen­
tration of the PKI in Surabaya is in the southern part of the City (primarily in 
Gubeng-trowongan, Patemen, and Pakis). There have already been purges in these 
areas. Earlier the PKI had established its own regulations there. The people 
were forbidden to listen to the radio or read the newspaper. The PKI enforced a 
curfew. The residents of the poorer neighborhoods [Kampung] had to be home by 
4.00 PM and could not leave until 5.00 the following morning. We are now taking 
measures against this. At this time secret kidnappings and killings are being 
carried out by the Religious groups.
Mojokerto
Of this area it can be said that things began in the first days, both from 
Krian to Mojokerto, and all the way to the Jombang area. Recently many 
headless corpses have lain sprawling in the rivers and along the river banks. The 
people and also the authorities have been afraid to remove them. At the 
initiative of several leaders of the People, the Indonesian Red Cross [PMI] took 
them away. On Sunday there were approximately 162 corpses, and on Monday, 
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In Mojokerto almost all the PKI leaders, activists, and executioners have been 
finished off. (PKI) prisoners held at Kodim or Police Headquarters, against whom 
there was enough evidence from proces verbaal [D: interrogation reports] have 
been taken away (the term used is ”dibonn1) and every night from four to ten 
people are killed. According to [those who take them away] legal proceedings 
take too long.
It has also often happened that PKI leaders have been attacked and beaten by 
their own followers, who blame them for dragging them into this situation, this 
having occurred in Madura (Zubir and Rasoel).
In Jombang, as the center of pesantren [Islamic schools], actions were carried 
out against the PKI from the very beginning. And frequently these Operations 
have been extended to the surrounding areas of Kertosono and Mojokerto.
The Kediri Area
The Kediri area has had the most PKI victims, partly as revarxce [stc] [D: 
revenge] for previous "affairs" (at Jengkol and the Lodoyo Pesantren). b The 
Kodim and the Brigif [Infantry Brigade] Commander, Col. Sampurno, have been 
very firm. And the actions here have been in the form of "joint action" [E] 
between the people and the army. Lieut. Col. Sampurno has said, "We have to
7. This was one of the strangest euphemisms of the period. "Dibon" means "used 
as security against a loan," and so could be translated perhaps as "pawned."
8. These were among the so-called "unilateral actions" [aksi sepihak], by pro­
communist peasant organizations in 1964-65 to try to put into effect the PKI’s 
land reform policies.
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obey the orders of the President, which say that if we want to catch the rats we 
shouldn't burn down the house, but kill the rats." After that began the killings 
of the rats (PKI). This occurred throughout the Residency of Kediri, from Blitar, 
Tulungagung, Trenggalek, and Kediri, as far as Ngandjuk. Prisoner-"pawning" has 
happened here as well. Prisoners are at some point moved from their original 
place of detention to another place, and during the journey they are intercepted 
by the People and finished off. If the killings were at first carried out by 
crowds (of about 20-30 people), they are now done by only four or five, in order 
to be careful not to frighten the people.
The Madiun Area
As reported above. Detentions and arrests have been executed by Willy 
Sudjono and also in the districts, as in Ngawi, where the Battalion Commander 
(Martak) has taken resolute action such as arresting the Bupati [regent] (PKI), 
and where actions by the People were begun. The situation in re Madiun has 
been reported on above.
Bojonegoro
In this area the suppression campaign has been very feeble, except in the 
areas which border Central Java. There have been insufficient military units, for 
example, in the Tuban area. Apart from this, the [strength of the] PKI has 
indeed been overwegend [D: predominant]. But more recently the suppression has 
begun. In the city of Bojonegoro, and in the areas bordering Mojokerto, Madiun, 
and Kediri, killings of PKI elements have also already spread.
The Malang Area
As indicated above, thanks to the "understanding" [E] between the Regional 
Commander and the Crushing Action Committee [Panitia Aksi Pengganjangan] (in 
Malang its Action Command is the Youth Front [Front Pemuda]), the people's 
actions and arrests have been numerous and very intensive. And the purges have 
gone forward continuously. This has occurred in all the Districts [kabupaten] 
(Pasuruan, Probolinggo, Lumajang, and Malang itself). And the repressive actions 
have been rather well organized, as, for example, in Dampit. PKI members were 
arrested by the people, and ordered to speak at a public meeting to denounce the 
PKI, and afterwards they were taken to point out and arrest their own leaders.
V. Concerning the Political Parties
The NU forms the vanguard of the movement to crush the PKI and its mass 
organizations. Within the NU forces there are two groups, one of which used to 
cooperate with the PKI. This group has been geisoleerd [Ds isolated]. The 
second is the anti-PKI group, which is now domineerend [D: dominant] in the NU 
itself. It is now led by Abdullah Sidik from Jember, who is indeed descended 
from a Kiai and has his own pesantren. Before Abdullah Sidik, the NU leadership 
was always headed by what they called the "Gersikan group" (the business and 
money-making group), but with Abdullah Sidik this tradition has been gebroken 
[D; broken]. The Nil's power in general derives from its legal and formal 
organizations, but its reele potentie [Ds latent, potential power] in fact lies in its 
Pesantren, which are under the leadership of seven large Pesantren. The 
geestelijke vader [D: spiritual father] of these pesantren is Kiai Bisri of the Den 
Anyar Pesantren, Jombang (he is the younger brother of Kiai Hasjim Asari,
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Jombang). There are four Pesantren in Jombang. The first is the Den Anyar 
pesantren, the second is Kiai Hasjim's, which is now officially led by Jusuf Hasjim 
(the Deputy Head of Ansor for all of Indonesia, the son of Kiai Hasjim Asari and 
the younger brother of Wahid Hasjim), while the third is the Tremas pesantren 
which is led by Wahab Hasbullah (the brother-in-law of Wahid Hasjim). And one 
formeele [D: formal] pesantren. s Aside from these Jombang pesantren, other 
pesantren include: the one at Pasuruan, led by Kiai Djupri; Gengong Kraksaan, led 
by Kiai Nun Achsan; the one at Paiton led by Kiai Zaini; and that at Asembagus, 
led by Kiai Asa’at. The Pesantren Kiai Sidik is led by Kiai H. Achmad Siddik 
(now head of the Department of Religion for East Java). Kiai Achmad Siddik is 
now coordinator for all these Kiai. These Kiai have always opposed the central 
NU leadership. This opposition was an issue of principle, because they did not 
agree with the line taken by Idham Chalid and the Rais Aam, Wahab Hasbullah, 
who cooperated with the PKI. They consider the PKI to be a Majusis [i.e., Parsi] 
group (goddelozen (D: atheists]), something forbidden by Islamic law. On the 
other hand, the Central NU were impelled by their personal interests to accept 
this cooperation, and also for their own safety. (Recall the incident involving the 
former Minister of Religion Wahib Wahab, the son of Wahab Hasbullah. This 
anti-PKI group is the one that is very domineerend [D: dominant]. (In the Kediri 
area Kiai Machroes is a member of this group.) Some of these Kiai belong to the 
"Suriyah NU"11 which determines Islamic law. Recently they held a meeting 
which declared uf [sic: off] with Bung Kamo and his followers. When they heard 
of efforts to bribe the leadership of NU at the Center (an offer of the Deputy 
Prime Ministership), they were very angry indeed. This group is in fact the 
powerful one in East Java, and they can also provide a stimulus for politics at 
the Center within NU circles. Their representatives at the Center are Kiai 
Dahlan and Jusuf Hasjim.
The NU party and its mass following, which are strong in certain respects, 
have several weaknesses [E: "lacks"] including the lack of a conseptionele operasis 
[sic] [D: operational conception]. And with their large mass following they often 
show "over-confidence" [E], negering [D: looking down on] the other political 
parties, and even, in several regions, the Armed Forces.
The Catholic Party
Two groups can also be found in the Catholic Party, and, as in the case of 
NU, the domineerend [D: dominant] one is now anti-PKI. Their mass following is 
more gedisplineerd [sic] [D: disciplined] and organized, and their key strength lies 
in their youth, especially college students. Their leader is Rusmo, a member of 
the Kasimo group.
The Protestant Party
The Protestant Party is very "confused" [E] to the extent that its leadership 
(Rasjid) is not only under suspicion by the other parties, but even by hun eigen 
gelederen [D: its own members]. His history is one not only of material manipu-
9. A traditional pesantren where instruction was given individually by the kiai.
10. In October 1962 Minister of Religion Wahib Wahab (son of the NU Rais Aam, 
Wahab Hasbullah) was tried for violating foreign exchange regulations and was 
sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and a Rp. 15 million fine. (Duta Masjara- 
kat, October 24, 1962.)
11. The legislative council of the NU.
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lations, but also of political corruption through his close cooperation with the 
PKI.
PSII [Indonesian Islamic Union Party]
The leadership is very verdeel [sic] [Ds divided] indeed, many of them having 
become leaders or members of Baperki [Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan 
Indonesia, Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship, a largely Chinese 
peranakan association, with ties to the PKI and other left-wing parties], a group 
which naturally is very much disliked by the Muslim masses now. But it [PSII] 
has very many followers in the Jember area because of one Kiai, Kiai Bakir, who 
is a PSII figure deeply respected by the people.
His influence is very widespread, reaching all the way to Madura (he also 
originates from Madura). There is -wrijving [D: friction] with NU because of 
rivaliteit [D: rivalry] and because they [the PSII] attract NU people to be 
gelederen [D: members] of their group. ([This is] the former AKUI, 12 which at 
the time of the general elections split off from NU, but after its defeat 70 
percent of its membership returned to NU, with the remaining 30 percent joining 
Kiai Bakir's PSII.) Kiai Bakir also tried to attract the 70 percent that went to 
the NU to enter the PSII, and this has brought complicaties [Ds complications] to 
many districts. Kiai Bakir has direct contact with Anwar Tjokroaminoto.
IPKI [League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence]
This organization is more compact, but in its gelederen [D; membership] 
soldiers and veterans are very few. Its contacts with the military have decreased 
substantially, primarily because leaders such as Nuch and Jakoub are no longer in 
East Java, and Jakoub is not active any more.
PNI-Hardi [Indonesian Nationalist Party-Hardi]
Only recently internally consolidated, and already gekonfronteerd [sic] [D; 
confronted] by external activities. They are trying to consolidate themselves, and 
they are generally betrouwbaar [D: trustworthy] and very anti-Communist.
PNI-Ali-Surachman [Indonesian Nationalist Party—Ali-Surachman]
Their strength still lies mostly in the GMNI [Movement of Indonesian 
Nationalist Students] and Youth, and it seems that they want to be the tegenpool 
[Ds direct opposite] of the anti komunistische groeperingen [sic] [D: anti-Com­
munist groups]. They have not participated at all in the actions—they want to go 
their own way. There are also some who act as refuges for potenties van de PKI 
[D: latent PKI forces]. Incidents may arise between them and the anti-Communist 
groups, especially Ansor.
Aside from these parties, there is also the HMI [Islamic Student Organization 
of Indonesia], which has better organization, complete with "planning" [E] and has 
many exponenten [Ds exponents] in the ranks of the Army (formerly Hizbullah) 
and the Navy.
12. AKUI (Angkatan Ummat Islam) was a minor Muslim party centered in East 
Java, which in 1955 drew most of its candidates from the Madurese. (See Herbert 
Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 [Ithacas Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 
1957], p. 59.]
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Activities can also be seen from the banned parties (Masyumi), PSI [Indone­
sian Socialist Party], and Murba [Proletarian], but generally they are holding 
themselves back in order not to complicate the situation. Many of them have 
surrendered leadership to the NU, it’s only that the NIPs "over-confidence” [E] is 
sometimes vervelend [Ds irritating].
VI. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)
Whereas in Jakarta, where the "shock-attack" [E] was defeated and its leader­
ship scattered, so much so that its leadership disappeared and it was difficult to 
carry out further actions, in East Java the authorities were so slow and miserably 
lamlendigheid [D: ineffective] that the PKI still has the opportunity to consoli­
date. So far, not many of their leaders have been arrested. It appears that their 
preparations have been concentrated in the areas of the Mt. Argapura Complex 
and the Mt. Arjuna Complex. The places they have fled to are in the south, 
(Zuid [D: South] Besuki, Zuid Malang, Zuid Madiun, all the way to Central Java). 
Their leadership have been able to escape, except in the Kediri area (Nganjuk, 
Blitar, Kediri, and Tulungagung, where the leadership was either killed or 
apprehended).
Many of their leaders are still active in Government Agencies and in basic 
enterprises. But in certain areas, particularly the Residencies of Kediri, Jombang, 
Mojokerto, Malang, Pasuruan, Probolinggo, and the Besuki Region, many leaders 
have been killed, and even many people who were not leaders. These killings 
have been carried on continuously and have now also spread to the areas of 
Madiun, Bojonegoro, and the outskirts of Surabaya.
In Kediri some of the killings were "joint action"s [E] with the military 
(sometimes in civiele [Ds civilian dress], sometimes officially as military). Killings 
of this kind may have a boomerang effect, in that they can also be utilized by 
the PKI itself. The effect upon economic life will also be felt. Small traders are 
now afraid to sell their wares. Peasant farmers are afraid to go to the rice 
fields. And many do not want to work on the Plantations, for example on the 
tea and sugar plantations, because corpses are spread everywhere.
By way of clarification, several events are explained below: In the Paree 
(Kediri) area there is a village in which the lurah [village headman] and Ansor 
together took the initiative to protect the [PKI] peasant farmers—who were only 
taggers-on~by giving them badges as members of Ansor or NU. They were 
gathered together, and coincidentally, there happened to be an operation by the 
military and Ansor going on. Seeing many people gathered together, the soldiers 
and Ansor asked the lurah who all these people were. The lurah, nervous and 
panicked, responded that they were PKI.
Before he had finished speaking, every one of the approximately 300 people 
was killed, and their families were not permitted to remove their bodies so that 
they were buried where they lay. This shocked the people, and within Ansor 
itself mutual mistrust arose.
Another event occurred in Wates, where approximately 10,000 members of the 
PKI and its Mass Organizations gathered together. They were going to make a 
"long-march" [E] to Madiun, destroying factories along the way. This was dis­
covered by the military, which initiated a "joint-action" [E] together with Ansor. 
When they were sommeer [sic] [D: called upon] to surrender they refused, and so 
they were crushed. The victims totaled 1,200.
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In an incident in Ponggok, a soldier who was disseminating information was 
killed by the Pemuda Rakyat [People’s Youth]. In represaille [D: reprisal] the 
military attacked, killing about 300 people.
The wave of killings is still continuing, and many of those who are being 
killed are followers who did not know much. Many excesses have emerged, and it 
could happen that the PKI will join in so that they can attract "public opinion" 
[E] to their side. There has also been conflict between different Islamic groups, 
as in Kediri between the Ansor of Kiai Machrus and the Darul Hadish group. The 
PKI surely benefits from this.
The economic effects are very alarming, because they will surely be exploited 
by the PKI.
VII. The Armed Forces
Basuki Rachmat’s attitude has greatly influenced developments in East Java. 
Because of his calmness and his slowness in taking actions which should have 
been taken quickly, many have had little faith in his beleid [D: policy], and many 
of the people particularly in the parties are suspicious, especially because of the 
inclusion of his name in the Revolutionary Council. 13 During a "briefing" [E] 
with his subordinates, they urged him to take action so that the initiative would 
not be taken by someone else. He answered, "Ik heb mijn eigen instruksis" [sic] 
[D: I have my own instructions]. His answer raised many questions about the 
person from whom he has been receiving his instructions; it is definitely not from 
the Pangad [Army Commander in Chief] or from Suad [Army General Staff] whose 
instructions are already clear. After this briefing, the Staff met with Surach- 
man, 14 whom they asked to speak with Basuki Rachmat. Surachman met with 
him, but with no resultaten [D: results]. Bij de Tweede [D: at the second] 
"briefing" [E] it was requested again that he be more firm; he practically had to 
be forced to freeze the activities of the PKI and its Mass Organizations, including 
the Neighborhood Associations [RT] and Kampung Associations [RK] which in 
Surabaya were almost all PKI.
It was understandable that at first the Army did not take action, since not 
only did they not have enough troepen [D: troops], but it is estimated that as 
many as 30 percent were "involved" [E] [in the coup]. Owing to the lack of 
action on the part of the Kodam [Territorial Command] it was mainly the Regional 
Commanders in East Java who took actions and initiatives, leading the extermina­
tion. The Regional Commander of Malang-Besuki, Sumadi, was the most firm. He 
arrested many PKI leaders and cadres, and he has been able to work together 
with the anti komunistische groeperingen [sic] [D: anti-Communist groups] in 
establishing an "understanding" [E] that a "joint operation" [E] be conducted with 
the Youth Front [Front Pemuda—youth section of the National Front].
13. In their broadcasts on October 1, 1965, the Untung group announced 
formation of a 45-member Revolutionary Council, which was apparently to assume 
a dominant governing role. The Council was made up of a strange assortment of 
people ranging from left to right of the political spectrum, many of whom had no 
connection whatever with the coup group.
14. Brig. Gen. Surachman had preceded Basuki Rachmat as Commander of the 
East Java Territorial Military Command. He had been suspected of being part of 
an anti-Sukarno movement and had been eased out of his position in 1962.
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Secondly, the Madiun Regional Commander, WILLY SOEDJONO, who because 
there were initially few "actions" by the people in his area, carried out arrests 
(about 200 in the city of Madiun alone) of PKI cadres.
The feeblest has been the Regional Commander of Surabaya, Bojonegoro, and 
Madura, Sunjoto. Within his Kodim there are still many followers of Soekar- 
danoe, 15 especially in the Bojonegoro area, where many within the Kodim and its 
Staff are PKI.
Even more difficult are the Puterpra, where there are many PKI within the 
BODM, so that sometimes many plans for arrests are leaked or obstructed. This 
is especially so in Jember and Bondowoso. In these areas there are some Field 
Artillery ["Armed"] elements which protect the PKI.
Concerning the various Units we have learned the following:
Battalions which are kwalificeer sterk geinfiltreer [sic] [D: considered to be 
strongly infiltrated] are Battalions 511, 512, and 513. Most of these units have 
already been transferred, including 512, which has been moved to Medan; and 511, 
part of which was sent to Kalimantan, and part to a strongly anti-Communist 
area. This is also the case with Unit 513, part of which is in Besuki, with the 
remainder sent outside.
Battalion 514: Its Commander Soedjangkung has already been removed; its
troops are generally betrouwbaar [D: reliable], consisting of men from Madura and 
former members of Hizbullah.
Battalion 515: Assigned to the SKI [Sekolah Kader Infanteri, Infantry Cadre
School], The East Java SKI is a center for PKI operations to infiltrate units of 
all kinds.
"Raiders" [E] Battalion 531: The Battalion Commander (Major Trijogo)
deserted on October 2 and has not yet returned. He is a former TRIP [Student 
Army in East Java] member.
The Battalions presently in Madiun are generally betrouwbaar. They have 
now been augmented by an Arsu [Artileri Sasaran Udara, Anti-aircraft] unit under 
Colonel Ardjito, which occupies the Mantingan-Cepu line.
Aside from these, Battalions 517 and 518 have been brought in from the 
border areas. Also, there is assistance from two Pattimura battalions, one 
Hasanudin Battalion 17 and one Kujang Siliwangi battalion, as well as a task-force 
from the RPKAD [army paratroop regiment].
The other Armed Forces units are those from the KKO [Marines] within which 
there are some Pemuda Rakyat elements. The officieren [D: officers] are loyal. 
Only among their subordinates, on the other hand, even though they were gekon- 
signeerd [sic] [D: confined] to their barracks, there were those who insisted on
15. Col. Soekardanoe Widjaja had held a number of top positions in the East 
Java command, including Fifth Assistant (for social and political affairs) to the 
Kodam Chief of Staff. He was regarded as a strong Sukarnoist.
16. These are the border areas between Indonesian Kalimantan and the East 
Malaysia States of Sarawak and Sabah where Confrontation with the newly formed 
Malaysia was going on.
17. The Pattimura were Ambonese battalions from Kodam 15 (Moluccas) and the 
Hasanuddin Bugis battalion was from Kodam 14 (South and Southeast Sulawesi).
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returning to their villages—most of which were PKI Centers (such as Gubeng- 
trowongan).
In addition to these, in Surabaya there are also two small battalions from 
Brimob [Mobile Brigade] at Sambongan and at Gresik Street. The men at Sam- 
bongan are loyal, but some of those on Gresik Street are geinfiltreerd [D: 
infiltrated, here infiltrators]. When there was a demonstration to burn down the 
PKI's CDB [HQ] on Penghela Street, they protected the Pemuda Rakyat. A total 
of 133 people were saved by the pretense that they were being arrested, but later 
were released.
With regard to the police, there are many rumors that East Java Pangdak 
[Regional Police Commander] Drs. Soemarsono was involved [in G.30.S], His 
actions have been very obstructive. Before the PKI was dissolved, he proposed 
dissolving all the parties and established a curfew. The next day the activities of 
the PKI were frozen by the Kodam [Territorial Command]. Very sterk-geaffileerd 
[D: strongly affiliated] with the PNI [Nationalists].
VIII. The Civil Service
The actions of the civil service, especially its leader, Brigadier General 
Wijono [Governor of East Java], have been very irresolute. Purges, which should 
have provided stimulus to other Agencies, have been only minimally carried out. 
"Brief ing"s [E] aan zijn [D: to his] staffs, even to those directly under him—-such 
as the Governor's representatives in the Residencies—have still not been carried 
out. The military klachten [D: complain] much about him, and there is no visible 
assistance from his corps, due to the fact that Wijono issues no clear directieven 
[D: directives]. The parties already greatly mistrust him. In filling vacant posi­
tions, he plays footsie with PNI-ASU people.
At the initiative of Col. Sumadi, the Regional Commander of Besuki-Malang, a 
meeting was organized last November 14 with several local Heads, Bupatis, Resi­
dents, and former Governors and Residents, both active and retired (among them, 
[ex-] governors Samadikun and Suwondo, Residents Bambang Suparto, Marwoso 
Suhardjo, Moh. Noer, and others), for the purposes of:
1. Finding a way to make the provincial government more dynamic 
(including Wijono and his people).
2. Finding a policy which would achieve more intensive cooperation 
between military and civilian authorities.
3. Solving problems which have arisen as a result of the extermination of 
the Gestapu/PKI.
4. Solving economic problems, which can be exploited by the PKI.
At the meeting it was decided to send a delegation to Wijono and the 
Military Commander [Panglima].
IX. Conclusion
In general, firm actions are needed by the authorities, with regard both to 
the suppression of the PKI and to excesses which can be damaging in this 
suppression struggle. Controlling excesses is very important. It is to be hoped 
that the new Territorial Commander [Pangdam, i.e., Brig. Gen. R. Sunarijadi],
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together with a firmer and more militant staff, can provide political leadership to 
the Anti Koministische [sic] groeperingen [Ds Anti-Communist groups].
The PKI still has the opportunity to consolidate itself, and it can launch 
attacks and create enclaves like the Viet-Cong, using "hit and run" [E] tactics 
and sabotage, which could paralyze ekonomisch leven [D: economic life].
Bearing in mind that East Java is their bolwerk [Ds stronghold], even though 
they can now be counterbalanced by the anti-Communist forces, and even though 
they are not strong militare warde [sic] [D: militarily], and can be handled mili­
tarily, still they can instigate anarchy, using "protracted-war" [E] tactics a la Mao 
Tse Tung while awaiting further opportunities in the international arena, which 
they can exploit. A frontal explosion is, of course, far from being a possibility.
This is the broad outline of the situation in the regions. A further report 
will follow.
Several things requiring attention
The first concerns the provincial government of East Java. Up to now [prob­
lems regarding] the working environment and order within the Governor’s Office 
itself have still not been overcome. (As is known, a PKI (SOBSI) demonstration 
on September 28 damaged the Governor’s Office.) The incident was caused to a 
large extent by the attitude of the Governor himself. Even now in his beleid 
personalia [sic] [D: personnel policy] he flirts [politically, main mata] with PNI- 
Ali-Surachman people. It is true that prior to GESTAPU, the Governor had much 
backing from NU, but he then began to compromise a great deal with the PKI and 
PNI. And he was very slow to carry out the suppression and purge, which should 
have been a stimulus for other Agencies of government. There have not even 
been directieven [D: directives] to the corps of the civil service. He has yet to 
brief zelfs de naaste medewerkers [D: even his closest co-workers] such as the 
Governor’s representatives in the Residencies. There has been insufficient 
cooperation with the military, so that much spanningen [D: tension] has arisen. 
These matters have caused Col. Sumadi, the Regional Commander of Malang- 
Besuki, to take the initiative in finding a way to make provincial government 
more dynamic. In fact, the parties are already ontevreden [D: discontented], and 
want to urge the center to replace him [i.e., Governor Wijono], ideally with 
someone from the military, which makes "sense" [E] in terms of administratief- 
beheer [D: administration-management] and staats-beleid [D: state policy].
There is a need to appoint a representative from the Center (from both KOTI 
[Komando Operasi Tertinggi, Supreme Operational Command] and from MBAD 
[Markas Besar Angkatan Darat, Army Headquarters]) as a "political commissar" [E] 
who will be better able to understand the situation and carry out further "follow­
up" [E] measures in the social, political—and most importantly—economic sphere. 
Such a Commissar would be able to communicate easily with the community, 
including the politik partijen [sic] [D: political parties] and other public figures.
As in the case of the Governor, as discussed above, almost all sectors have 
endeavored through every forum or institution possible to mendoorbraak [sic] [D: 
doorbraak = break through] the slowness, indeed the impotence in the ranks of 
officialdom.
Krachtig [Ds strong] words indeed, but action has been extremely slow.
Jakarta, November 29, 1965

